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A b s t r a c t We follow the guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative and the
European Public Real Estate Association to investigate the quality of
real estate-related sustainability information provided by European listed
real estate companies in 13 countries. We find that human resources and
stock price volatility play a significant role in the company’s strength
with respect to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Business
complexity and financial transparency enhance the provision of
sustainable information to capital markets, but business experience does
not appear to affect the decision ‘‘to go CSR.’’ Furthermore, the benefits
of ex ante responsible activities are reflected in lower levels of
idiosyncratic risk, but only for firms providing clear signals to investors
and markets.
Over the last decade, socially responsible activities and sustainability in a broader
sense have been successfully integrated into corporate strategies and are now
considered as an essential value-driver for the long-term success of listed or public
companies. Corporate responsibility forces firms allocating resources to preserve
a balance between environmental, social, and economical objectives, which may
affect internal and external stakeholder groups. Companies maintaining this
equilibrium require a socially responsible sustainability agenda, along with a
description of short- and long-term action items. The purpose of this study is to
identify the factors affecting the firm-specific decision to allocate resources into
socially responsible activities and whether these corporate actions mitigate the
firm’s risk profile. We provide evidence that socially responsible activities are
rewarded by investors and capital markets in a reduction of a company’s
idiosyncratic risk.
We have organized the paper as follows. The sections of the paper are split into
the two research questions: the drivers of a responsible provision of information
and the consequences of providing responsible information. The first section
situates our research questions and hypotheses within the existing literature
concerning sustainability and real estate. The second section describes our data.
The third explains the econometrical methodology in order to explain the results
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in the fourth section. At the end we discuss our findings and present our
conclusions.
 L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a growing matter over the last
ten years and its diffusion has already reached listed enterprises, non-government
organizations, and inevitably real estate companies. Many concepts have been also
developed to theoretically describe corporate sustainability activities, such as
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG), CSR, and Socially Responsible
Investment (SRI). Despite the conceptual differences across them, they describe
the integration of responsible and environmental activities into a firm’s core
strategy in order to react to climate changes and globalization issues in general.
As a response to the increasing importance of sustainability, firms provided
voluntarily supplementary information regarding their concerns and awareness to
global changes. Sustainability principles, in accordance to the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), are well known standards that enable the international comparison
of firms’ responsibility performance. The GRI framework is applicable to all
sectors and since its foundation the number of sustainability reports has grown
exponentially. In this context, real estate companies are important participants to
the international development and implementation of sustainable policies.
According to Nelson, Rakau, and Doerrenberg (2010), the construction and real
estate industry has an enormous global impact and ‘‘accounts for 42% of the EU’s
final energy consumption and for about 35% of all greenhouse gas emissions.’’
Facing the fact that sustainability plays an important role in the real estate sector,
due to the impact to future generations, it is essential to identify the key elements
of sustainable activities, along with their economical benefits. The first subsection
examines the mechanism that drives firms to allocate resources in sustainability,
while the second subsection explores the economical consequences of the effective
resource allocation.
The Drivers of a Responsible Provision of Information
Solow (1991) defines sustainability simply as ‘‘our obligation to future
generations.’’ In general, firms are active players in the implementation of global
sustainability policies and mitigation of risks that affect future generations. Porter
and Kramer (2006) delineate this approach as ‘‘license-to-operate’’ and explain
that firms identify themselves with social and environmental concerns due to
future global challenges. Otherwise, firms would be acting outside their ‘‘license’’
and would disappear. Roberts, Rapson, and Shiers (2007) show that the drivers of
social responsibility are an internal adaptation to economic change such as
customer demand, as well as an external response to poor ethical standards.
Additionally, Falkenbach, Lindholm, and Schleich (2010) argue that real estate
companies aim to invest in CSR to enhance their image to investors through the
publication of sustainability reports. Furthermore, they conclude that external
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financial incentives and regulatory policies force companies to revaluate their core
strategies.
A growing literature concentrates on the determinants of voluntary disclosure
following the GRI guidelines. Among others, a debate arises concerning whether
media visibility or media presence predicts the decision ‘‘to go CSR.’’ Rationally
speaking, the assumption that sustainability reports have an impact on corporate
reputation and are a media instrument that reveals the positive and negative aspects
of a firm’s strategies could be right. Albers and Guenther (2010) concentrate on
the determinants of disclosing the social reports of 600 European firms and
conclude that social reports are likely to be published by high capitalized
companies and by those adhering to sustainability indices. They suggest that media
presence is not a determinant for firms ‘‘going CSR.’’ Contradictorily,
Gamerschlag, Moeller, and Verbeeten (2010) show that for Germany, higher media
visibility increases the probability to disclose a CSR report. For the field of real
estate, only a few European companies disclose GRI reports and the empirical
evidence is small. Instead of examining media visibility, which highly correlates
with size, we aim to expand the literature by analyzing if financial transparency
determines CSR.
Sustainability includes the effective use of resources and an adequate substitution
of resources to minimize consumption (Solow, 1991). For the field of real estate,
it is essential to understand the benefits of property investments that consider
energy-related, social, and environmental features. Fuerst and McAllister (2009,
2011), Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2009a, 2009b), and Bienert et al. (2010)
show that sustainable buildings in general pay off. These findings lead real estate
companies to allocate sustainable buildings in their portfolios to force the
reduction of energy consumption.
Following these results, companies allocate resources to CSR in order to remain
competitive. It is also rationale to assume that real estate firms react to customer
demand. This paper examines the real estate-specific characteristics that influence
the intensity of sustainable and responsible activities.
The Consequences of Providing Responsible Information
Looking at responsibility and sustainability in order to reveal their link to
economic performance requires a clear conceptual framework and definition of
variables. A large body of meta-analyses examine if sustainability predicts
financial performance (e.g., Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Margolis,
Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2007). Generally, they find evidence that firms with high
levels of social and environmental performance enjoy enhanced financial
performance and vice versa. Apart from several measurement effects, sector
heterogeneity, and the sample period, these findings motivate firms allocating
resources to CSR activities. On a corporate level, Porter and Kramer (2006)
explain that socially responsible activities should have a positive impact on
corporate value, preconditioned that their integration into the firm’s core
operational business is successful. Therefore, a sustainability agenda must not only
cover vague strategies and goals, it must reflect a high awareness to social
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and environmental concerns. Following Surroca, Tribo´, and Waddock (2010),
corporate responsibility positively affects financial performance through the
creation of intangible assets (i.e., sustainability not only enhances a firm’s
reputation, it can improve financial outcomes). They conclude that the more
intensive and effective a firms sustainability strategy, the higher will be the
economic benefits.
Concerning the risk profile of companies investing in CSR, a growing body of
literature provides evidence that sustainability in a broader sense is able to lessen
firms’ unexplained stock volatility. Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) found that
corporate responsibility is able to generate stakeholder value and mitigate
information asymmetry due to the enhanced provision of information. Information
regarding the firm-specific sustainability agenda is a clear positive signal to capital
markets and investors. Their results suggest that sustainability activities affect
negatively the future unexplained stock volatility, decreasing the idiosyncratic risk.
Lee and Faff (2009) argue that sustainability portfolios exert significantly lower
levels of idiosyncratic risk, hence sustainability creates, beside the above explained
effects, financial stability in terms of a better pricing mechanism (i.e., CAPM).
Ferreira and Laux (2007) provide strong evidence that a well-developed corporate
governance level also lessens the idiosyncratic risk and enhances the information
about the distribution of expected cash flows. Following this result, we aim to
provide empirical support that sustainable and responsible activities lead to lower
idiosyncratic risk and consequently reduce the uncertainty of a firm’s risk profile.
We believe that the existing real estate literature focuses to a major extent on the
economic impact of responsible investments on a property-specific level. In this
context, other sustainable real estate-specific activities that play an important role
and might affect the overall value of the portfolio or company are a barely
untouched research field. Therefore, our approach not only strengthens and
supports the related literature on idiosyncratic risk, but also confirms the helpful
consequences of responsibility at a company level.
 D a t a
The data for our study are from SNL, Thomson Reuters Datastream, and annual
reports.1 The sample includes European real estate listed firms for 2007 and 2008
that are incorporated in the Global Property Research Index 250 (GPR 250),
excluding real estate funds. Our initial sample included 84 companies, from which
four do not provide sufficient financial information in Datastream. The final
sample includes 80 European real estate companies. The annual reports were
obtained from SNL and the enterprise’s web pages. All data are employed in a
yearly frequency, except for the returns. We use daily returns for the closing day,
in order to calculate the yearly mean return, along with our proxies for both
estimation and idiosyncratic risk. All variables controlled for possible outliers at
5% and 95%.
We are interested in the quantity and quality of socially responsible information
for real estate companies. Our variables measure the firm-specific commitment to
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social responsibility in accordance with the European Public Real Estate
Association (EPRA) and general sustainable reporting guidelines (GRI-G3). In
order to derive our proxies for CSR, we use a questionnaire that has 13 questions
and 26 points. Several studies have proxied sustainability using questionnaires.
For example, Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath, and Wood (2009) employ content
analysis techniques to externally categorize the amount of information that fall
into one of the main GRI-sustainability categories, whereas Plumlee, Brown, and
Marshall (2008) concentrate on a separated corporate environmental report and
apply an index scorecard to calculate the quality of disclosed information. Similar
to these studies, we define the following four responsibility areas as: (1) human
rights and social responsibility; (2) environmental responsibility; (3) investment/
financial responsibility; and (4) additional disclosure quality. Human rights and
social responsibility strengths consider not only the extent to which rights are
considered in the company organization, but also information about the company’s
cultural, diversity, and recruitment policy. The environmental responsibility covers
procedures related to training and raising awareness in relation to environmental
aspects, as well as information concerning emissions, waste, and materials. This
area covers also the investment in sustainable buildings. Investment/financial
responsibility asks whether the company is prepared for climate changes in
economical terms, whereas the additional disclosure area covers at what level
companies apply EPRA-Best Practices Recommendations. The former drives firms
to run scenario analysis of the key performance indicators due to energy price
fluctuation and is following the GRI a key factor for real estate companies
(Exhibit 1).
In order to avoid time-embedded bias, three researchers read the annual reports
independently and 14% of the reports were evaluated doubly to ensure the
correctness. We assign 2 points when a firm discloses key performance indicators,
1 point for only explanatory information, and 0 for no information. Exhibit 2
presents the results of our sustainability survey. The values are calculated as the
sum of the obtained points divided by the maximal achievable points. We
breakdown our results by year, real estate sector, and sustainability area. Over
2007 and 2008, we found a constant sustainability agenda with levels under 50%.
European real estate investment trusts (REITs) present generally higher scores than
non-REITs and present in 2007 high levels in the environmental and financial
responsibility area. All firms present a high acceptance of the EPRA-BPR.
Following the GRI, firms should model scenario analysis to determine the financial
consequences of energy price fluctuations and weather disasters. Our survey shows
low levels concerning environmental risks, which are essential in view of climate
change and its associated costs. It is remarkable to establish constant sustainability
levels in view of the economical cycle in 2007 and 2008. Surroca, Tribo´, and
Waddock (2010) propose that resource allocation to CSR activities preconditions
a stable economical situation. Contradictory to this proposition, we observe a
slightly increasing strength for sustainable and responsible activities across
European real estate companies, particularly by REITs.
We derive two variables from our survey in order to explain the drivers and
consequences of CSR. Therefore, we define our first variable inqualityCSRi,t
dependence to the maximum number of score items as follows:
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Exhibi t 1  Sustainability Agenda for Listed Real Estate Companies
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Exhibi t 2  Results of the Sustainability Survey
Sector
2007
Non-REITs REITs
2008
Non-REITs REITs Overall
Number of firms 42 38 42 38
All sectors 46.98% 48.26%
(7.29) (6.42) 47.62%
Yearly 42.83% 51.12% 44.99% 51.54% (6.85)
(6.27) (8.23) (5.96) (6.90)
Responsibility Areas
Human Rights &
Social Responsibility
41.07% 43.42% 40.18% 44.41% 42.27%
Environmental
Responsibility
44.05% 61.18% 44.05% 54.61% 50.97%
Financial Responsibility 27.08% 41.12% 31.85% 29.93% 32.50%
Disclosure and
Transparency
59.13% 58.77% 63.89% 77.19% 64.75%
Notes: Percentage represents the sum of points relative to the maximal points. Standard deviations of points
in parentheses.
2 ⇔ (Points)  Qi,t 77
qualityCSR  1 ⇔ Q  (Points)  Q (1)i,t 33 i,t 77 0 ⇔ (Points)  Qi,t 33
Companies whose overall score for the key performance indicators is
quantitatively high belong to the highest category,  2. Companies thatqualityCSRi,t
disclose only general goals and information belong to  1. The upperqualityCSRi,t
(lower) quintile was 18 and 17 (7 and 8) points for 2007 and 2008, respectively.
We assign this ordered response category, as described by Davidson and
MacKinnon (2004), in order to generate a latent variable. This approach enables
us to investigate the independent factors that lead to more detailed and intensive
CSR disclosure (i.e., the variables contribute to the highest information category).
Because our focus also lies on the effects of CSR on idiosyncratic risk, we employ
an exogenous proxy from our survey to explain the consequences of providing
responsible information. takes the value of 1 for  2 and 0high qualityCSR CSRi,t i,t
otherwise. takes the value of 1 for  1 and 0 otherwise. We relaxlow qualityCSR CSRi,t i,t
the assumption of information quality and generate a binary variable that
contributes to the robustness check of our models. We assign to takequantityCSRi,t
the value of 1, if the sum of items, independent of the information category, is
higher than or equal to the median of all companies, and 0 otherwise:
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1 ⇔ (Points)  Qquantity i,t 50CSR  (2) i,t 0 ⇔ otherwise
measures the overall amount of information independent of thequantityCSRi,t
disclosure category (i.e., regardless of qualitative and quantitative information).
We use this specification to validate and enhance the veracity of our empirical
survey. The 50% quantile was 9.5 and 11 points for 2007 and 2008, respectively.
We estimate the idiosyncratic risk according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). Rather than taking the standard deviation of the daily residuals directly,
we use the measures of Ferreira and Laux (2007). Therefore, we estimate asset
pricing regressions with daily returns data within a two-year window. For each
firm we calculate our measure for idiosyncratic risk i,t as:
21  R SSRi  log  log , (3) 	  	i,t 2R ESSi
where is the coefficient of determination of each asset pricing equation. We2Ri
estimate information risk using the accruals quality model of Francis, Lafond,
Olsson, and Schipper (2005) with regional adjustment. Information risk arises
from the unexplained matching between working capital accruals and operational
cash flow. There is strong evidence of the accuracy of this variable as a proxy for
information risk (e.g., Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 2005; Francis, Khurana, and
Pereira, 2005; and Ecker et al., 2006). High values of information risk
communicate the poor quality of accruals (i.e., low-quality information to
investors, thus low financial transparency). Our proxy for estimation risk is
calculated as the logarithm of the standard deviation of the daily stock price for
the last two years, divided by the mean of its price. Market value is calculated as
the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The number
of employees, audit fee, and ROA are obtained either from Datastream or from
the annual reports.
Exhibit 3 presents the descriptive statistics. The market value of our real estate
companies is on average approximately at e13.156  517104.366 Mio C and is
constant over 2007 and 2008. In order to prevent some heteroscedasticity
problems, we use the natural logarithm and assume 1C auditing fees.2 Concerning
the age of European real estate companies, we observe firms that have been listed
in the respective market since 1965, which means a maximum of 44.08 years at
the end of September 2010. Information risk and estimation risk (Volat) are
standard deviations that significantly positively correlate. The ROA is not constant
over our observation period, because of the market-based response of the
‘‘financially poor’’ years, 2007 and 2008.
The sample contains only real estate companies (REITs and non-REITs)
measuring financial performance with Funds from Operation (FFO),3 rather than
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Exhibi t 3  Descriptive Statistics
Size Audit Fee Info Risk Age Employees Volat ROA
Idiosyncratic
Risk FFO
CSR
Quantity
CSR
Quality
Unit Log Tsd. [C] Std. Dev. Log Number Std. Dev. %/100 Log Tsd. [C] Bivariate Latent
Mean 13.156 951.1 0.042 5.286 257.656 0.119 0.016 1.058 105,148.7 0.519 0.875
Max. 16.321 7,300.0 0.138 6.271 3,550.0 0.321 0.285 2.158 641,145.0 1.000 2.000
Min. 9.902 0 0.004 4.025 0 0.014 0.325 0.045 27,015.10 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 1.258 1,416.9 0.024 0.583 501.899 0.057 0.090 0.628 179,303.7 0.501 0.896
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Exhibi t 4  Correlation Matrix
Size Audit Fee Info Risk Age Employee Volat ROA
Idiosyncratic
Risk FFO
CSR
Quantity
CSR
Quality
Size —
Audit Fee 0.44* —
Info Risk 0.02 0.07 —
Age 0.15 0.16 0.07 —
Employee 0.48* 0.42* 0.25* 0.30* —
Volat 0.17* 0.06 0.18* 0.14 0.22* —
ROA 0.18* 0.12 0.18* 0.07 0.09 0.35* —
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.58* 0.28* 0.16* 0.03 0.32* 0.03 0.04 —
FFO 0.43* 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.38* 0.03 0.07 0.43* —
CSR Quantity 0.40* 0.40* 0.02 0.16* 0.52* 0.25* 0.13 0.43* 0.31* —
CSR Quality 0.44* 0.38* 0.05 0.18* 0.57* 0.18* 0.10 0.44* 0.32* 0.85* —
Note:
*Pearson correlation coefficient significant at 10%.
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with net income, because of its accuracy in estimating the performance of real
estate companies (e.g., Tsang, 2006). By analyzing the linear relationship of our
second explanatory variable (Idiosyncratic Risk), we observe that this correlates
negatively with size and FFO. This implies that real estate-specific financial
performance is associated with lower levels of idiosyncratic risk and vice versa.
The description of variables is shown in Exhibit 8.
 M e t h o d o l o g y
Drivers of a Responsible Provision of Information
Because is an ordered categorical variable, we estimate the followingqualityCSRi,t
latent regression via maximum likelihood as an ordered probit model with three
categories, two threshold parameters, and without a constant:4
qualityCSR   log(Mval)   AuditFee   log(Emplo)i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t
  InfoRisk   log(Age)   log(Volat)4 i,t 5 i,t 6 i,t1
  ROA   Region   Year  u .7 i,t 8,9 i 10 t i,t (4)
We expect the CSR intensity to increase for market value our proxy forˆ ,1
business complexity AuditFee and human resources log(Emplo)ˆ ˆ ,  .2 3
Information risk is expected to be negative, because it represents ‘‘theˆ ,4
likelihood that firm-specific information that it is pertinent to investors pricing
decisions is of poor quality,’’ (Francis, Lafond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005). We
expect to be statistically insignificant because experienced companies invest inˆ5
CSR, just as unskilled companies. Therefore, business knowledge does not
influence either the decision ‘‘to go CSR’’ or its intensity. Elevated levels of stock
price volatility, the estimation risk, of the past period should enhance a firm’s CSR
strength in the next period and therefore  0. Financial performance shouldˆ6
contribute to sustainable activities and their intensity,  0.5 Region and Yearˆ7
control for regional heterogeneity and time-varying effects. Our robustness check
relaxes the assumption concerning the quality levels of CSR information by taking
only the amount of information as dependent variable.
quantityCSR   log(Mval)   AuditFee   log(Emplo)i,t 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t
  InfoRisk   log(Age)   log(Volat)4 i,t 5 i,t 6 i,t1
  ROA   Region   Year   .7 i,t 8,9 i 10 t i,t (5)
We estimate the model as a binary probit regression, taking into account that the
transformation leads to a loss of information. Nevertheless, we expect the same
effects as with equation 4.
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Consequences of Providing Responsible Information
We study the consequences of enhanced responsible information provision on a
firm’s idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the error term .i,t1
between the estimated and predicted stock returns, estimated by the market model
and scaled by the firm’s total risk. We expect that, as the quality of CSR activities
increases, financial markets compensate for this strength through aqualityCSRi,t
reduction of the idiosyncratic risk.
  	  	 log(MVal)  Return  	 FFOi,t1 0 1 i,t i,t 3 i,t
high low 	 Sector  	 CSR  	 CSR  
 . (6)4 i 5 i,t 6 i,t i,t
Consequently, we regress on market value as a control for size, one yeari,t1
mean return, financial performance measured as FFO and control for real estate-
specific sector variations. Concerning the error term, we estimate the regression
assuming random effects for the iid error term 
i,t, in order to control for firms’
unobserved heterogeneity. We expect to be negatively related to idiosyncraticˆ	1
risk, because the size effect captures this variation observed by Fama and French
(1992). According to Lee and Faff (2009), the higher the return, the higher the
idiosyncratic risk  0. We control for FFO in order to proxy for the investors’ˆ	
perception of firm-specific real estate financial performance. Considering our
CSR-variables, we expect a significant negative effect on the firm’s idiosyncratic
risk and  The latter is the case, because refers to a higher intensityˆ ˆ ˆ	  	 . 	5 6 5
of responsibility than indicating that the greater the strength of responsibleˆ	 ,6
activities, the greater the reduction in We run a robustness check by relaxingˆ .i,t1
the assumption of information quality and regress future idiosyncratic risk on both
our control variables and quantityCSR :i,t
  	  	 log(MVal)  	 Return  	 FFOi,t1 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t
quantity 	 Sector  	 CSR   . (7)4 i 7 i,t i,t
In order to provide additional support to the hypothesis that a sustainability agenda
in general does pay off, all else equal, we expect to be negative, significant,ˆ	7
and lower than ˆ	 .5
 E m p i r i c a l R e s u l t s
Drivers of a Responsible Provision of Information
Exhibit 5 presents the regression results of the factors that lead to an enhanced
disclosure quality of socially responsible activities. The variance inflation factors
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Exhibi t 5  Drivers of a Responsible Provision of Information
Variable/Coefficient
Model 1
Coeff. Z-Stat
Model 2
Coeff. Z-Stat
Model 3
Coeff. Z-Stat
Log(MValue) 1 0.363 3.096*** 0.512 4.744*** 0.403 3.472***
Audit Fee 2 0.172 2.091** 0.247 4.125***
Log(Employee) 3 0.366 3.725*** 0.411 4.168***
Information Risk 4 12.640 2.800*** 8.185 1.656* 12.227 2.812***
Log(Age) 5 0.076 0.355 0.086 0.403 0.123 0.581
Log(Volatility) 6 0.705 3.397*** 0.979 4.501*** 0.641 3.013***
ROA 7 1.946 1.710* 1.422 1.139 2.322 2.070**
West Europe 8 1.235 2.952*** 1.058 2.472** 1.446 3.546***
Scandinavia 9 1.592 3.579*** 1.788 3.939*** 1.653 3.750***
Year Dummy 10   
1 5.000 3.134*** 5.780 3.594*** 5.606 3.721***
2 5.800 3.612*** 6.510 4.032*** 6.393 4.219***
n*T 160 160 160
Pseudo R2 31.91 26.62 30.87
LogL 112.884 121.655 114.597
F-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0qualityCSRi,t 75
 1qualityCSRi,t 30
 2qualityCSRi,t 55
Notes: The table uses a latent ordered probit regression approach. The dependent variable is qualityCSR ,i,t
which is a latent variable with three categories. Companies whose provision of responsible information is
quantitatively high belong to the highest category. Companies disclosing only general information about their
sustainable activities belong to the next category.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
lie below 2.5 and signal no collinearity within the regressors. Model one indicates
that as CSR information increases, the market value of the company increases as
well. This result corresponds with previous research (Albers and Guenther, 2010;
Gamerschlag, Moeller, and Verbeeten, 2010) and is significant at   1%. We
are able to confirm that the intensity of socially responsible activities increases,
ceteris paribus, whenever the number of employees increases, Furthermore,ˆ .3
the estimated coefficient for information risk is negative: the greater theˆ4
information risk, the lower the financial transparency and therefore the lower the
CSR intensity. This result implies that, over 2007 and 2008, real estate companies
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intensified their CSR activities, which enhanced financial transparency. Therefore,
it is important to establish this relationship and to consider financial transparency
as a positive contributor to sustainable and responsible activities.
Our latent regression shows that the business experience proxied by log(age),ˆ ,5
does not enhance the probability to intensify CSR activities. Therefore, CSR is
an innovative field that does not require extensive business knowledge. However,
the estimated coefficient for stock price volatility shows that enhancedˆ6
estimation risk in the past year increases the probability of investing intensively
in CSR activities in the present period. We do not predict a sign for business
complexity As Exhibit 5 shows, the more complex an enterprise’s businessˆ .2
model, the greater their efforts to invest in sustainability. This is important because
it is logical to believe that complexity suppresses responsibility. We are able to
show at   1% that this is not in fact the case and that real estate companies
invest in CSR, perhaps precisely because of the implied posterior benefits. The
estimated coefficient of ROA must be interpreted with caution. The Z-statisticˆ7
of the predicted regression coefficient is low and insignificant in model two. This
could be due to a negative impact of ROA on CSR, but the explanatory power of
ROA is low. This result is confusing, because, as described theoretically, financial
performance should enhance CSR. We regard this negative coefficient as a market-
based response of the ‘‘financially poor’’ years of 2007 and 2008. Nevertheless,
our latent regression in model one has an explanatory power of 31.91%, with 68
degrees of freedom.
Finally, we consider the regional differences by adding two dummy variables:
West Europe and Scandinavia. West Europe takes a value of 1 for west Europe
including the UK and Scandinavia. It is clear that the probability of achieving a
more intensive level of sustainable activities is higher for Scandinavian real estate
companies, than for all other countries This result is in accordance with theˆ .9
survey of KPMG (2009), which indicates the advanced legal and reporting level
these countries have concerning general sustainable reporting and GRI guidelines
application.
The robustness check for our latent regression employs a probit estimation
approach. Exhibit 6 shows that the estimated probit model is able to confirm
increased business complexity and number of employees raises theˆ ˆ2 3
probability of providing more general information concerning sustainable
activities. It also shows that the regional differences are present and that enhanced
stock price volatility influences CSR activities positively.
The coefficient of determination indicates an explanatory power of about 39.5%.
However, business transparency and financial performance are at   10% and 
 5%, which are both statistically insignificant. This indicates that the explanatory
power of financial transparency influences the quality of information quality(CSR )i,t
rather than the amount of information quantity(CSR ).i,t
Consequences of Providing Responsible Information
Our second research question concentrates on the effect of present enhanced
information on sustainable activities, as well as its effect on future idiosyncratic
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Exhibi t 6  Drivers of a Responsible Provision of Information
Variable/Coefficient
Model 1
Coeff. Z-Stat
Model 2
Coeff. Z-Stat
Model 3
Coeff. Z-Stat
Log(MValue) 1 0.403 2.842*** 0.512 4.197*** 0.505 3.959***
Audit Fee 2 0.460 3.102*** 0.438 3.377***
Log(Employee) 3 0.308 2.787*** 0.318 2.944***
Information Risk 4 8.788 1.583 4.553 0.784 7.057 1.393
Log(Age) 5 0.080 0.317 0.085 0.334 0.131 0.543
Log(Volatility) 6 0.914 3.367*** 1.085 3.900*** 0.798 3.023***
ROA 7 1.576 0.981 1.283 0.778 2.893 1.875*
West Europe 8 0.969 2.051** 0.864 1.853* 1.340 2.761***
Scandinavia 9 1.469 2.801*** 1.726 3.331*** 1.639 3.103***
Year Dummy 10   
n*T 160 160 160
McFadden R2 42.46 38.26 37.77
LogL 63.748 68.405 68.941
F-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 1quantityCSRi,t 83
 0qualityCSRi,t 77
Notes: The table uses a bivariate probit regression approach. The dependent variable is whichquantityCSR ,i,t
measures the overall amount of information, with respect to the median, independent of the disclosure
quality.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
risk for European real estate companies. We regress future idiosyncratic risk on
the present CSR variables and control for size, one-year mean return, sectors, and
real estate-specific financial performance. Exhibit 7 shows our estimation. Model
1 uses two dummy variables to measure for CSR, while model two employs only
one and serves as our robustness check.
Our results indicate that higher returns positively influence idiosyncratic risk,
although affects market value negatively. Higher FFOs lead to lower idiosyncratic
risk. The estimated coefficient sign indicates that enhanced present financial
profitability can reduce the variation between estimated and predicted return for
real estate companies By interpreting our coefficients for corporate socialˆ	 .3
responsibility and we find statistically significant evidence that disclosureˆ ˆ	 	 ,5 6
leads in the future to a decrease in idiosyncratic volatility for the ensuing years.
This result holds only for firms that disclose profound key performance indicators,
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Exhibi t 7  Consequences of Providing Responsible Information
Variable/Coefficients
Model 1
Coeff. t -Stat
Model 2
Coeff. t -Stat
Model 3
Coeff. t -Stat
Constant 	0 3.891 8.873*** 3.847 8.810*** 3.946 9.238***
Log(MValue) 	1 0.196 5.783*** 0.189 5.647*** 0.197 5.933***
Return 	2 0.307 4.560*** 0.303 4.501*** 0.313 4.734***
FFO 	3 0.009 3.175*** 0.008 2.819*** 0.008 2.984***
REITS 	4 0.236 2.168** 0.229 2.134** 0.233 2.176**
CSR High Quality 	5 0.153 2.436**
CSR Low Quality 	6 0.061 0.823
CSR Quantity 	7 0.097 1.683*
Hausman Test (p-V) 2  4.544 (0.208) 2  4.762 (0.446) 2  5.975 (0.201)
n*T 160 160 160
Adj. R2 27.11 29.26 28.51
F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table is an OLS Regression with White diagonal standard errors. The dependent variable is
Idio Risk (t  1), which measures the idiosyncratic risk for each asset derived from the market model
following Ferreira and Laux (2007). It is calculated as the logarithm of the sum of square residuals divided
by the explained sum of squares.
*Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
goals achieved, and quantitative information, so that the firms are viewed as highly
sustainable (i.e., high strength in terms of human rights, and social, environmental,
and financial activities). Firms disclosing information on general activities and
actions are not able to enjoy benefits in the next period. By analyzing our second
model as our robustness check, we provide evidence that the overall strength ˆ	 ,7
without taking the quality of the information into account, decreases the
unexplained stock volatility, but the estimated coefficient of is lowerquantityCSRi,t
than which means that for the idiosyncratic risk mechanism, the quality ofˆ	 ,5
information plays a more important role than the quantity. Both quality and
amount have a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk, but the latter has a weaker
impact. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination explains approximately 28%
of the system variation.
Consequently, these results indicate that firms disclosing CSR information are
recompensed by the market, but these benefits are only exploited intensively by
firms disclosing comprehensive CSR information, such as like the key indicators
of CO2 emissions and energy consumption levels.
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Exhibi t 8  Variable Description
Name Abbreviation Description
Market Value MVal Market value measured as the share price multiplied by the
number of ordinary shares in issue [MV].
Audit Fee Audit Fee Expenditures for external auditing fees in C [WC01801].
Age Age Number of months since inclusion to the stock market.
Number of Employees Emplo Number of employees [WC07011].
Stock Price Volatility Volat Stock price volatility divided by the mean stock price in a two-year
estimation window [P]: log(Volat)i,t  (Stock price)i,t/Stock pricei,t
Return on Assets RoA Return on Assets in C [WC08326].
Idiosyncratic Risk IdioRisk Measured as logarithm of the sum of squared residuals divided by
the explained sum of squares from the one-factor market model,
using the one-month Euribor as risk-free rate and the individual
market return: i,t  log(1  /  log(SSR/ESS). We2 2R R )i i
normalize the idiosyncratic volatility to the total volatility for each
asset, rather than by industry, because of the regional
heterogeneity of our sample.
Funds from Operations FFO Firm-specific Funds from Operation in C [WC04201].
CSR-Quality quailityCSR Latent variable taking the value of 2 if the provided CSR-
information is of high quantitative information; the value of 1 for
qualitative information and 0 for no information.
CSR-Quantity quantityCSR Binary variable taking the value of 1 if the amount of provided
information is greater than the median, independently of the
quality of CSR information.
CSR-High-Quality CSR-High Binary variable taking the value of 1 for  2 and 0qualityCSR
otherwise
CSR-Low-Quality CSR-Low Binary variable taking the value of 1 for  1 and 0qualityCSR
otherwise
West Europe dummy West Europe Binary variable taking the value of 1 for Belgium, France,
Germany, Netherland, United Kingdom, and Austria.
Scandinavia dummy Scandinavia Binary variable taking the value of 1 for Finland, Norway and
Sweden. The reference category is Greece, Turkey, Italy, and
Switzerland.
Information Risk InfoRisk Standard deviation of the past four residuals of cross-sectionally
regressions: t  (t  4, ... , t). The higher the standard(eˆ ),i,t
deviation, the higher the information risks. Model following
Francis et al. (2005) controlled for country heterogeneity: TCAi,t/
TAi,t1  1 1/TAi,t1  2 CFOi,t1 /TAi,t1  3 CFOi,t/TAi,t1 
4 CFOi,t1 /TAi,t1  5 REVi,t/TAi,t1  6 PPEi,t/TAi,t1 
7,8Regioni  ei,t. Because our sample contains only real estate
firms, we add two dummy variables that control for regions, rather
than regressing for each industry sector.
Total Current Accruals TCA Total current accruals calculated as CA  CL  StDebt 
Depr. ( from t  1 to t ).
2 2 8  C a j i a s a n d B i e n e r t
Exhibi t 8  (continued)
Variable Description
Name Abbreviation Description
Total Accruals TAC Total accruals calculated as TCA  Depr.
Total Assets TA Total current assets [WC02999].
Cashflow from
Operations
CFO Cashflow from operations calculated as NIBE  TAC.
Revenues REV Revenues [WC01001].
Property, Plant and
Equipment
PPE Property, Plant and Equipment [WC02301].
Current Assets CA Current Assets, calculated as [WC02651]  [WC02051] (Other
Assets  Receivables).
Current Liabilities CL Current Liabilities calculated as [WC03351]  [WC02051] (Total
Liabilities  Current Liabilities).
Short-term Debt StDebt Short-term Debt [WC03051].
Depreciation Depr Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization [WC01151].
Net Income before
Extraordinary
NIBE Net Income before Extraordinary [WC01551].
Note: Codes in brackets represent the respective Worldscope Datastream Code.
 C o n c l u s i o n
After developing a survey in accordance to the guidelines from the GRI and
EPRA, we measure the extent and intensity of sustainable activities of listed
European real estate companies over 13 countries.
Our first research question reveals an increasing strength in CSR activities among
European real estate companies, particularly among REITs. We conclude that CSR
activities are influenced positively by market value, the number of employees, and
auditing fees. Higher levels of financial transparency enhance the intensity and
quality of socially responsible activities, whereas the probability of ‘‘going CSR’’
increases significantly for companies whose past stock price volatility is high.
Our second research question shows that ex ante CSR activities are rewarded by
a reduction in unexplained stock variance (i.e., the idiosyncratic risk). Therefore,
in order to exploit additional benefits, real estate companies should structure their
CSR activities in such a way that clear signals are sent to capital markets.
Furthermore, the greater the intensity and quality of ex ante CSR information, the
lower the idiosyncratic risk. The analysis provides evidence that the overall
strength in CSR activities is proportionally related to its benefits.
Our study is limited by the size of the sample. Nevertheless, we expect to expand
our methodology by applying non-parametric models to identify possible non-
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linear effects and see the importance of this statistical field because of the lack of
empirical results for real estate and sustainability. We believe that further
investigations in this field should concentrate on the (possible) non-linear
mechanism of CSR activities and financial performance. Furthermore, we are the
first study, to our knowledge, a latent ordered probit regression model to
investigate the drivers for a high provision of responsible information to capital
markets.
 E n d n o t e s
1 www.snl.com; www.datastream.com.
2 Leaving this implication behind, we found similar results, so that this assumption does
not lead to incorrect inferences.
3 Funds from Operations (FFO) are defined by Tsang (2006) as ‘‘an alternative (measure)
to net income.’’ Specifically, FFO is calculated ‘‘by adding back the net income the
amount of depreciation and amortization related to real estate properties, gains and losses
on the sale of real estate assets, and certain other unusual and infrequent specific accrual
items.’’
4 Estimation procedure excludes a constant, because the system would otherwise not be
identifiable.
5 We also estimate equations 4 and 5 with FFO as a proxy for real estate financial
performance and achieve the same results.
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